


Optimal Controller Synthesis for the Decentralized Two-Player Problem with Output Feedback

**Laurent Lessard, Lund University
with Sanjay Lall, Stanford University**

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
The classical (centralized) LQG problem



- ▶ \mathcal{P}_{ij} and \mathcal{K} are matrices of proper rational transfer functions.
- ▶ Find a stabilizing \mathcal{K} that minimizes

$$\left\| \mathcal{P}_{11} + \mathcal{P}_{12}\mathcal{K}(I - \mathcal{P}_{22}\mathcal{K})^{-1}\mathcal{P}_{21} \right\|_{\mathcal{H}_2}$$

The decentralized LQG problem



- ▶ \mathcal{K} has sparsity pattern \mathcal{S} . e.g.

$$\begin{bmatrix} u_1 \\ u_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{K}_{11} & 0 \\ \mathcal{K}_{21} & \mathcal{K}_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} y_1 \\ y_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

- ▶ **Assumption:** \mathcal{P}_{22} also has sparsity pattern \mathcal{S} .

Previous Work

Bad news:

- ▶ Optimal controller is nonlinear even for simple LQG examples
[Witsenhausen 1968]
- ▶ Decentralized controller synthesis is hard in general
[Blondel, Tsitsiklis 2000]

Good news:

- ▶ Large classes of decentralized problems can be convexified
[Ho, Chu 1972; Qi, Salapaka, et al 2004; Rotkowitz, Lall 2006]
- ▶ In many such cases, the optimal controller is linear
[Ho, Chu 1972; Rotkowitz 2008]

Great news:

- ▶ Explicit state-space solution for state feedback with sparsity
[Swigart, Lall 2010; Shah, Parrilo 2010]
- ▶ Characterization of separable problems
[Kim, Lall 2012]

Centralized solution

State-space formula for the plant:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{P}_{11} & \mathcal{P}_{12} \\ \mathcal{P}_{21} & \mathcal{P}_{22} \end{bmatrix} = \left[\begin{array}{c|cc} A & B_1 & B \\ C_1 & 0 & D_{12} \\ \hline C & D_{21} & 0 \end{array} \right]$$

Optimal controller:

$$\mathcal{K}_{\text{opt}} = \left[\begin{array}{c|c} A + BK + LC & -L \\ \hline K & 0 \end{array} \right] \quad \begin{aligned} K &= \text{are}(A, B, C_1, D_{12}) \\ L &= \text{are}(A^T, C^T, B_1^T, D_{21}^T)^T \end{aligned}$$

Interpretation:

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\xi} &= A\xi + Bu - L(y - C\xi) \\ u &= K\xi \end{aligned}$$

$$\xi = \mathbf{E}(x | \mathcal{Y})$$

Two-player solution

State-space formula for the plant:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{P}_{11} & \mathcal{P}_{12} \\ \mathcal{P}_{21} & \mathcal{P}_{22} \end{bmatrix} = \left[\begin{array}{c|cc} A & B_1 & B \\ \hline C_1 & 0 & D_{12} \\ \textcolor{red}{C} & D_{21} & 0 \end{array} \right] \quad A = \begin{bmatrix} A_{11} & 0 \\ A_{21} & A_{22} \end{bmatrix}, \text{ etc.}$$

Optimal controller:

$$\mathcal{K}_{\text{opt}} = \left[\begin{array}{cc|c} A + BK + \hat{L}C & 0 & -\hat{L} \\ B(K - \hat{K}) & A + B\hat{K} + LC & -L \\ \hline K - \hat{K} & \hat{K} & 0 \end{array} \right]$$

- ▶ K and L same as in centralized case
- ▶ $\hat{K} \sim \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ * & * \end{bmatrix}$ and $\hat{L} \sim \begin{bmatrix} * & 0 \\ * & 0 \end{bmatrix}$, so $\mathcal{K}_{\text{opt}} \in \mathcal{S}$

Two-player solution

Optimal controller:

$$\mathcal{K}_{\text{opt}} = \left[\begin{array}{cc|c} A + BK + \hat{L}C & 0 & -\hat{L} \\ B(K - \hat{K}) & A + B\hat{K} + LC & -L \\ \hline K - \hat{K} & \hat{K} & 0 \end{array} \right]$$

Interpretation:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\zeta} &= A\zeta + B\hat{u} - \hat{L}(y - C\zeta) \\ \hat{u} &= K\zeta\end{aligned}$$


$$\zeta = \mathbf{E}(x | \mathcal{Y}_1)$$

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\xi} &= A\xi + Bu - L(y - C\xi) \\ u &= K\zeta + \hat{K}(\xi - \zeta)\end{aligned}$$

$$\xi = \mathbf{E}(x | \mathcal{Y}_{1,2})$$

Outline of solution method

1. Modified Youla parameterization:



2. Model-matching problem

$$\underset{\substack{\mathcal{K} \text{ stabilizing} \\ \mathcal{K} \in \mathcal{S}}}{\text{minimize}} \| \mathcal{P}_{11} + \mathcal{P}_{12} \mathcal{K} (I - \mathcal{P}_{22} \mathcal{K})^{-1} \mathcal{P}_{21} \|$$

becomes: $\underset{\substack{\mathcal{Q} \text{ stable} \\ \mathcal{Q} \in \mathcal{S}}}{\text{minimize}} \| \mathcal{T}_1 + \mathcal{T}_2 \mathcal{Q} \mathcal{T}_3 \|$

Outline of solution method

3. Person-by-person optimality

$$\underset{Q_{ij} \text{ stable}}{\text{minimize}} \left\| T_1 + T_2 \begin{bmatrix} Q_{11} & 0 \\ Q_{21} & Q_{22} \end{bmatrix} T_3 \right\|$$

- ▶ fix Q_{11} and solve for Q_{21}, Q_{22} .
- ▶ fix Q_{22} and solve for Q_{11}, Q_{21} .

4. Impose matching conditions (**key step!**)

5. Transform back $\mathcal{Q} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$.

Solution details

Standard AREs:

$$(X, K) = \mathbf{are}(A, B, C_1, D_{12}) \quad (\tilde{X}, J) = \mathbf{are}(A_{22}, B_{22}, C_1 E_2, D_{12} E_2)$$
$$(Y, L) = \mathbf{are}(A^\top, C^\top, B_1^\top, D_{21}^\top)^\top \quad (\tilde{Y}, M) = \mathbf{are}(A_{11}^\top, C_{11}^\top, E_1^\top B_1^\top, E_1^\top D_{21}^\top)^\top$$

Coupled linear equations:

$$(A_{22} + B_{22}J)^\top \Phi + \Phi(A_{11} + MC_{11}) - (\tilde{X} - X_{22})(\Psi C_{11}^\top + U_{21})V_{11}^{-1}C_{11} +$$
$$(Q_{21} + J^\top S_{12}^\top + \tilde{X}A_{21} - X_{21}MC_{11}) = 0$$

$$(A_{22} + B_{22}J)\Psi + \Psi(A_{11} + MC_{11})^\top - B_{22}R_{22}^{-1}(B_{22}^\top \Phi + S_{12}^\top)(\tilde{Y} - Y_{11}) +$$
$$(W_{21} + U_{21}M^\top + A_{21}\tilde{Y} - B_{22}JY_{21}) = 0$$

New control and estimation gains:

$$\hat{K} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ -R_{22}^{-1}(B_{22}^\top \Phi + S_{12}^\top) & J \end{bmatrix} \quad \hat{L} = \begin{bmatrix} M & 0 \\ -(\Psi C_{11}^\top + U_{21})V_{11}^{-1} & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Optimal decentralized cost

$$\mathcal{J}_{\text{opt}} = \left\| \begin{bmatrix} A + BK & | & B_1 \\ \hline C_1 + D_{12}K & | & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right\|^2 \quad \text{centralized cost}$$

$$+ \left\| \begin{bmatrix} A + LC & | & B_1 + LD_{21} \\ \hline D_{12}K & | & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right\|^2$$

cost of decentralization

$$+ \left\| \begin{bmatrix} A + B\hat{K} + \hat{L}C & | & (\hat{L} - L)D_{21} \\ \hline D_{12}(\hat{K} - K) & | & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right\|^2$$

Summary

For two-player output feedback:

- ▶ Each player estimates the global state
- ▶ Some gains are decoupled, found by solving separate AREs
- ▶ Others are coupled, found by solving **linear** equations
- ▶ Can quantify the cost due to decentralization

Rough structure:

$$u_{\text{opt}} = K \hat{x}_{|1} + \hat{K} (\hat{x}_{|2} - \hat{x}_{|1})$$

Further Information

- ▶ Complete proof of the two-player problem (submitted TAC)
- ▶ Extension to the broadcast case (submitted CDC'12)

<http://www.control.lth.se/lessard/>

Thank you!