Ph.D. course on Network Dynamics Homework 5

To be discussed on Wednesday, January 25, 2012

In class, we have considered network dynamics of the following form. Given a finite graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, a finite local state (or 'opinion') space \mathcal{X} , and local transition kernels $\Psi_v(x'|x_v, x_{\mathcal{N}_v})$ for every $v \in \mathcal{V}$, we consider a stochastic process (in fact, a continuous-time Markov chain) $X(t) = \{X_v(t) : v \in \mathcal{V}\}$ on the product space $\mathcal{X}^{\mathcal{V}}$, whereby every node (often called 'agent') $v \in \mathcal{V}$ gets activated at the ticking of an independent rate-1 Poisson clock, and, if activated at some time $t \geq 0$, it updates its opinion to $X_v(t^+) = x'$ with conditional probability $\Psi_v(x'|X_v(t), X_{\mathcal{N}_v}(t))$.

We have argued that, if the transition kernels are homogeneous, i.e., if $\Psi_v(x'|x_v, x_{\mathcal{N}_v}) = \tilde{\Psi}(x'|x_v, d_v, x_{\mathcal{N}_v})$, and if the population is totally mixed (i.e., the graph \mathcal{G} is the complete one on n nodes), then one can give up on keeping track of the opinions of the single agents and rather take a 'Eulerian' viewpoint, and look at the evolution of the empirical density of the agents' opinions, defined by $\rho_x^n := n^{-1} |\{v \in \mathcal{V} : X_v(t) = x\}|$. In fact, under such assumptions of total mixing of the population and homogeneity of agents' behavior, the vector $\rho^n(t) := \{\rho_x^n(t) : x \in \mathcal{X}\}$ forms a Markov chain on the space of opinion types $\mathcal{P}_n(\mathcal{X}) := \{\rho \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathcal{X}} : n\rho_x = n_x \in \mathbb{Z}_+, \sum_x n_x = n\}$.

Moreover, Kurtz's theorem guarantees that, under the additional technical assumption that $\tilde{\Psi}(x'|x,\rho)$ is Lipschitz-continuous in ρ for every $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$, there exist positive constants K, K' such that, for all $T > 0, \varepsilon > 0$,

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\sup_{t\in[0,T]}||\rho^{n}(t)-\rho(t)||\geq\varepsilon\right)\leq K'\exp(-Kn\varepsilon^{2}/T)\,,$$

where $\rho(t)$ is the solution of the Cauchy problem associated to the mean-field

ODE

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_x = \sum_y \rho_y \tilde{\Psi}(x|y,\rho) - \rho_x \,, \qquad x \in \mathcal{X} \,,$$

with initial value $\rho(0) = \rho^n(0)$.

Exercise 1. Prove that $|\mathcal{P}_n(\mathcal{X})| = \binom{n+|\mathcal{X}|-1}{|\mathcal{X}|-1}$. (Hint: one has to count the different ways of assigning n identical balls to $|\mathcal{X}|$ distinguished urns. Consider $|\mathcal{X}| - 1$ identical bars whose role is just separating the balls belonging to the different $|\mathcal{X}|$ urns. Then, one is left with counting the number of possible ways of placing such separating objects in a universe of $n+|\mathcal{X}|-1$ elements...) Contrast the polynomial growth rate of $\binom{n+|\mathcal{X}|-1}{|\mathcal{X}|-1}$ with the exponential one of $\mathcal{X}^{\mathcal{V}}$ as $|\mathcal{V}|$ grows large with $|\mathcal{X}|$ constant.

Exercise 2 (mean-field limit of the (smoothed) majority rule dynamics). The (smoothed) majority rule dynamics is characterized by local state space $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}$ and transition kernel $\Psi_v(1|x_v, x_{\mathcal{N}_v}) = \Phi(d_v^{-1} \sum_{w \in \mathcal{N}_v} x_w)$, where $\Phi : [0, 1] \to [0, 1]$ is Lipschitz continuous and such that $\Phi(0) = 0$, and $\Phi(1 - x) = 1 - \Phi(x)$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$.

(a) Prove that the mean-field limit ODE is given by

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_1 = \Phi(\rho_1) - \rho_1; \qquad (1)$$

(b) Find the equilibria of (1), discuss their stability and characterize their basin of attraction.

Exercise 3 (k-majority rule dynamics). Let k be a positive odd integer and $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ a graph such that $d_v \geq k$ for all $v \in \mathcal{V}$. Consider the k-majority rule dynamics whereby each agent, when activated, selects k distinct neighbors of its uniformly at random and moves towards the opinion held by the majority of them. Find the mean-field ODE characterizing the limit when $N \to +\infty$ and study the asymptotic behavior (as t grows large) of the associated initial value problem.

Exercise 4 (mean-field limit of the SIS epidemics). Consider the SIS epidemics with rate- $\frac{\gamma}{n-1}$ transmission time on every link with one infected and one susceptible end-node, and rate- $(1 - \gamma)$ exponential recovery time, where $\gamma \in (0, 1)$.

- (a) Define a local state space \mathcal{X} and write down the transition kernel $\Psi_v(x'|x, x_{\mathcal{N}_v})$ for every $v \in \mathcal{V}$ (hint: assume that a node gets activated whenever it has a potential recovery or gets a potential decease transmission from one of the other n - 1 nodes)
- (b) What are all the absorbing states in $\mathcal{X}^{\mathcal{V}}$ of the Markov chain X(t) on a general connected graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$?
- (c) Prove that the mean-field limit ODE is

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_S = (1-2\gamma)\rho_I + \gamma\rho_I^2 \\ \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_I = -(1-2\gamma)\rho_I - \gamma\rho_I^2 \end{cases}$$
(2)

(d) What are the equilibria of (3)? Discuss their stability as γ varies in (0, 1).

Exercise 5 (mean-field limit of the SIR epidemics). Consider the SIR epidemics with rate- $\frac{\gamma}{n-1}$ transmission time on every link with one infected and one susceptible end-node, and rate- $(1 - \gamma)$ exponential recovery time, where $\gamma \in (0, 1)$.

- (a) Define a local state space \mathcal{X} and write down the transition kernel $\Psi_v(x'|x, x_{\mathcal{N}_v})$ for every $v \in \mathcal{V}$ (hint: assume that a node gets activated whenever it has a potential recovery or gets a potential decease transmission from one of the other n - 1 nodes)
- (b) What are all the absorbing states in X^V of the Markov chain X(t) on a general connected graph G = (V, E)? And what are they on the complete graph?
- (c) Prove that the mean-field limit ODE is

$$\begin{cases} \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_{S} = -\gamma\rho_{S}\rho_{I} \\ \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_{I} = \gamma\rho_{S}\rho_{I} - (1-\gamma)\rho_{I} \\ \frac{\mathrm{d}}{\mathrm{d}t}\rho_{R} = (1-\gamma)\rho_{I} \end{cases}$$
(3)

- (d) Plot the flow diagram of (3);
- (e) What are the equilibria of (3)?
- (f) Prove that every trajectory of (3) is convergent to some limit $\rho^* \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X})$, which depends on the initial condition $\rho(0)$; (hint: $\rho_S(t)$ is non-increasing, $\rho_R(t)$ non-decreasing, and the trajectoris belong to the compact $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X})$)
- (g) Let $\mathcal{R} := \{ \rho \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X}) : \rho_I = 0 \}$, $\mathcal{R}^S_{\gamma} := \{ \rho \in \mathcal{R} : \rho_S \leq 1/\gamma 1 \}$, and $\mathcal{R}^U_{\gamma} := \mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{R}^S_{\gamma}$. Prove that, for every initial condition $\rho(0) \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{X}) \setminus \mathcal{R}^U_{\gamma}$, the solution of (3) satisfies

$$\lim_{t \to +\infty} \rho(t) \in \mathcal{R}^S_\gamma;$$

(h) Conclude that, for $\gamma > 1/2$,

$$\rho_I(0) > 0 \implies \lim_{t \to \infty} \rho_R(t) \ge 2 - 1/\gamma > 0.$$

Exercise 6. Consider the following heterogeneous voter model. We have a totally mixed population consisting of N_{α} people of type α and N_{β} of type β . All people are selected with the same probability. When an α -agent (respectively, a β -agent) is activated, it chooses a neighbor uniformly at random in the entire population (who can be either an α or a β) and takes its opinion with probability q_{α} (resp. q_{β}).

- (a) Write down the transition kernel;
- (b) Propose a meaningful mean-field approach to this model and following the ideas discussed before Theorem 1 in the notes (discrete dynamics over networks), find the system of differential equations describing the limit when N = N_α+N_β → +∞ under the assumption that N_α/N → ν_α and N_β/N → ν_β.
- (c) Study the asymptotic behavior of the system of differential equations found in item (a) as a function of the four parameters ν_{α} , ν_{β} , q_{α} , q_{β} .
- (d) Discuss theoretically or numerically the effect of adding flipping terms in the dynamics accounting for spontaneous opinion flipping (as in the 'classical' voter model).